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Many who study the Russian Federation’s post-Cold War 
path point to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO) actions in the early 1990s as a key factor in under-
standing Russia’s attitudes and actions in the 21st century. 
Specifically, they cite NATO’s decision to enlarge its mem-
bership as the cause of Russia’s shift away from integration 
with the West and towards an independent path emphasiz-
ing its great power history and uniquely Eurasian identity. 
While there is some truth to this argument, it is, at best, an 
over-simplified one. This article will explore the greater con-
text of Russia’s initial divergence from the West focusing on 
the the fundamentally different and ultimately incompati-
ble understandings of the post-Cold War order, and the fact 
that any security arrangement that incorporated Russia was 
anathema to many of the newly independent states and to 
NATO. It will then address the 2008 war between Russia and 
Georgia and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine in the context of 
both NATO’s initial enlargement and its 2008 summit in 
Bucharest. Ultimately NATO bears, at most, partial respon-
sibility for events to its east. The situation now, as in 1994, 
is not so much the direct result of NATO’s decisions, pro-
nouncements, and actions as it is an inevitable divergence 
of Russia’s and NATO’s paths after the end of the Cold War.
A Perpetual Great Power Narrative
It is generally agreed that in the early 1990s, Moscow, under 
President Boris Yeltsin, was determined to integrate Russia 
with the West, including the security community and struc-
tures. Russia’s support of NATO’s involvement in Bosnia’s 
civil war through 1993 and its initially positive reaction to 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program both support this 
observation. Vincent Pouliot, director of the Centre for In-
ternational Peace and Security Studies, suggests that NATO 
managed to “lose Russia…at a time it was begging for inclu-
sion” when it announced in December 1994 that the Alliance 
would consider whether – and how – to enlarge its mem-
bership. This decision, he posits, suppressed pro-Western 
voices in the Russian leadership, created a sense of exclusion 
in Russia, and prompted the spread and entrenchment of a 
great power narrative. In combination, these effects turned 
Russia away from integration and cooperation with the West 
and, as made opposing NATO a foreign policy objective in 
and of itself.  
To dispute the allegation that NATO’s expansion frustrat-
ed and angered the Russian government would be inac-
curate, but to point to this event, or to NATO generally, 
as the primary cause of Russia’s divergence and modern 
hostility towards the West is specious. First of all, the “NA-
TO’s fault narrative” ignores the impact of shock therapy, 
or the immediate liberalization of the market, on Russian 
popular attitudes towards the West. Economic reform was 
launched in earnest in January 1992 and produced sig-
nificant and severe hardship for millions of people. Many 
Russians became convinced that the West – and especially 
the U.S. – deliberately proffered economic advice designed 
to undermine and further weaken Russia. They faulted 
Yeltsin and his pro-West advisors for the imposition of 
debilitating reforms. One can reasonably argue that this 
suppressed the pro-integration minority at least as much 
as NATO’s later enlargement announcement. 
The shocks inflicted by economic reform and structural 
adjustment, combined with significantly smaller-than-ex-
pected aid from the U.S., forged a painful economic real-
ity and sense of isolation in Russia entirely unrelated to 
NATO. This likely played an important role in the evolu-
tion of Russia’s relations with the Alliance. According to 
Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, 
Russia sees NATO as a “code word” for U.S.-led and –ori-
ented power structures and alliances in Europe. Thus, Rus-
sian perception of U.S. stinginess – especially when Yeltsin 
seemed to concede everything the West asked of him – 
likely hardened Russia against NATO expansion early on. 
Russia understood the U.S. to be undermining it econom-
ically, so NATO – and therefore American – enlargement 
eastward was merely an extension of the U.S.’s effort to 
establish permanent and indisputable dominance and to 
fundamentally eradicate Russia’s great power status. 
The NATO explanation also fails to acknowledge the fact 
that the Duma elections of December 1993 saw a clear vic-
tory for nationalist forces over pro-West forces. Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii and his far-right Liberal Democratic Party 
specifically ran on a platform promising to restore Russia 
to its great power status. This election predated NATO’s 
announcement that it was considering expansion by a full 
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Disagreements over the appropriate response to the crisis 
in Bosnia in the early 1990s also suggested incompatibil-
ities early on. Although Russia (along with several NATO 
members) supported dozens of U.N. Security Council res-
olutions on Yugoslavia, it often did so with reluctance and 
only after much hesitation and prodding from the U.S. Fi-
nally, Trenin highlights an absence of a true and widespread 
commitment to political reform and democracy in Russia 
in the early 1990s. This reality sets it apart from Central and 
Eastern Europe and helps explain Russia’s exclusion from 
developments to its west. Russia was unable or unwilling to 
fully and convincingly commit to the European path that 
NATO represented. Permanent reconciliation and integra-
tion required either Russia or NATO to profoundly alter its 
own nature and its understanding of security. Neither was 
able or willing to do so, and thus divergence was inevitable. 
The Shadow of the Warsaw Pact
A vital component of the “NATO’s fault narrative” is the 
idea that some alternative European security arrangement 
– be it Russia’s inclusion in NATO, an entirely new frame-
work, or something else – was possible in the early 1990s. 
There are certainly arguments to be made for Russia’s pro-
posals that it jointly guarantee East European security 
with NATO, or that NATO be subordinated to the Orga-
nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
It is important to appreciate, however, the extent to which 
NATO members desired the Alliance’s perpetuation and 
freedom of action and how eager many Central and East-
ern European governments were to win security guaran-
tees from the West against Russia. NATO was cognizant of 
the desirability and even the need to find a place for Rus-
sia in the European security structure, but any framework 
year, and it seems plausible that the outcome was more re-
lated to the economic situation in Russia than to anything 
else. Moreover, from the time he gained power Yeltsin con-
stantly battled nationalists in and outside of government 
over what they perceived to be his humiliating subservi-
ence to the West and the U.S. in particular. This suggests 
that NATO’s enlargement did not create or directly revive 
the great power narrative in Russia. While it may have in-
flamed it or given it additional momentum, there is reason 
to believe that even in the absence of the Alliance’s ex-
pansion, this narrative would have come to dominate the 
Russian political scene. In other words, great power-ness 
was ascendant in Russia before NATO enlargement truly 
became an issue.
Incompatible Ideas
A pre-existing great power narrative has important impli-
cations for Russia’s failure to integrate into Western insti-
tutions. Trenin notes that great powers do not integrate 
themselves into systems for which they did not establish 
the governing rules. This suggests that Russia’s favorable 
attitude towards NATO and integration with the West 
more generally was more precarious than is popularly 
appreciated, even in the early Yeltsin years. Of particular 
importance is the fact that Russia’s great power narrative 
was directly related to its self-understanding as a uniquely 
Eurasian country that never fully adopted a truly Europe-
an identity. Indeed, some argue that only small groups of 
Russia’s liberal intelligentsia ever attempted to incorporate 
the values associated with the European Enlightenment. 
The implication here is that Russia would find it especial-
ly difficult to integrate with Western institutions because 
not only did it not create those rules to which it would 
become beholden, but those rules are largely based on val-
ues not inherent to or even prevalent within the Russian 
state. Overall, any rapprochement with the West could 
only be temporary – Russia was bound to diverge at some 
point, and at most NATO’s enlargement discussion merely 
caused it to do so sooner than it otherwise might have.
There are other reasons to believe that a Russia-West split 
was unavoidable. For example, the West saw NATO en-
largement as an important (and perhaps the only) tool for 
ensuring the success of political and economic reform in 
Central and Eastern Europe, as well as avoiding the out-
break of the sort of conflict that was ravaging the former 
Yugoslavia. Enlargement was thus vital to NATO securi-
ty, while Russia perceived it as profoundly inimical to its 
own. Despite efforts on both sides to reassure the other, 
these contradictory understandings remain true today. 
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that forced former Warsaw Pact members to rely on Russia 
for their security was unacceptable to those states. This was 
especially true of the Visegard states – the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – who saw the electoral 
success of the far right in Russia’s 1993 Duma elections as 
indicative of a long-term threat to their hard-won indepen-
dence. Even today – nearly twenty-five years after the fall of 
the U.S.S.R – Poland sees Russia as a menace and acts as a 
significant stumbling block in the latter’s relations with the 
EU (which ostensibly focus primarily on economic issues). 
Central and Eastern Europe’s memory of abuse and oppres-
sion made the integration of Russia into a security system 
impossible. From its perspective, then, NATO faced a choice 
between two security frameworks: one in which the Alliance 
enlarged while trying to reassure Russia of its benign intent, 
or no security structure for the East at all. They discounted 
the latter option as it invited perpetual instability and conflict 
on NATO’s borders. Thus strong Eastern European voices 
and NATO’s own institutional incentives for survival (as well 
as U.S. President Bill Clinton’s personal determination to pull 
Eastern Europe westward), combined with Russia’s own un-
certainty about the path it wanted to follow, led the Alliance 
to pursue enlargement and simply hope it would be able to 
placate Russian concerns and maintain cooperative relations 
while it did so. That this resulted in divergent paths for the 
two is as much Russia’s “fault” (here referring to the conse-
quences of history and domestic politics) as it is NATO’s.
Enlargement and Conflict in the 21st Century
More recently, many argue that the 2008 war between Rus-
sia and Georgia is a perfect example of NATO’s self-de-
feating and destabilizing enlargement practices. Pouliot 
notes that the Alliance perceives Russian aggression as 
justification for enlargement while failing to acknowledge 
and/or understand that this aggression is itself a response 
to NATO expansion. The August 2008 war, for exam-
ple, followed on the heels of NATO’s Bucharest Summit, 
where the Alliance announced that Georgia and Ukraine 
would one day become members (although it declined 
to present them with Membership Action Plans). Once 
again, isolating NATO pronouncements and decisions as 
the sole driver behind Russian policy is to set aside vi-
tal historical context that has an important role. Russia 
and Georgia have a history of tumultuous relations go-
ing back to Georgia’s independence. Russian involvement 
in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
since the early 1990s has been a particular source of ten-
sion largely unrelated to NATO-Russia interactions. The 
situation in Georgia in 2008 presented an ideal oppor-
tunity to punish Georgia for its anti-Russian orientation 
– itself an affront to Russian great power-ness. In addi-
tion, Russian frustration with American ballistic missile 
defense initiatives in Europe and Kosovo’s 2008 declara-
tion of independence – both of which undermined Rus-
sia’s self-perception as a co-equal player with the U.S. in 
Europe – likely acted as additional incentives to under-
take action in Georgia when the opportunity presented 
itself. All of this supports the idea that Russia’s war with 
Georgia was as much a demonstration that it had fully 
regained its great power status and demanded to be treat-
ed accordingly, as it was an attempt to keep Georgia out 
of NATO. NATO’s promise of membership for Georgia 
was undoubtedly a factor in Russian decision-making 
(and may have even been a primary one), but to ignore 
the role of these other elements is to create an incomplete 
understanding of Russian actions. 
With regards to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, it should 
be noted that President Putin applied significant pressure 
to former president Yanukovich to reject closer economic 
ties with the European Union – a distinct (though not 
necessarily entirely unrelated) issue from NATO enlarge-
ment. Furthermore, Russia pressured a generally pro-Rus-
sia president who was unlikely to pursue NATO member-
ship, and did so several years after American President 
George W. Bush had left office. NATO expansionary rhet-
oric had receded significantly, and the Alliance’s divisions 
over enlargement were no secret. All of this suggests that 
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thermore, the fact that the great power narrative never 
completely disappeared from Russian self-perception sug-
gests that even Yeltsin’s early and eager cooperation with 
the West rested on precarious foundations: this narrative 
meant Russia could not accept a role as just another Euro-
pean state. The struggles the great power narrative created 
for integration with the West were further compounded by 
the West’s (and especially Central and Eastern Europe’s) 
reluctance to allow Russia in. Finally, while events in Geor-
gia in 2008 can be linked rather clearly to the specter of 
Alliance enlargement, once again the situation was in fact 
more complex, with a legacy of stressed and hostile rela-
tions that predate NATO-Russian tensions. The ongoing 
crisis in Ukraine also has roots that reach far deeper than 
NATO’s decision to expand its membership, and illustrates 
the extent to which Russia-West divergence exists not just 
in the security realm but in political and economic ones as 
well. 
All of these factors lead back to the fundamental issue of 
what precisely the post-Cold War order should look like. 
NATO and the West fervently promoted liberal democra-
cies founded on Enlightenment principles and integration 
with their existing structures. Although Yeltsin and his 
cadre of pro-Westerners certainly tried to shift the Russian 
political system into something compatible with the West, 
ultimately there appears to have been no consensus with-
in Russia on the path forward even before NATO started 
to contemplate enlargement. In fact, ascendant forces fa-
vored the great power path that, in the Russian narrative, 
inherently sought to challenge the West. The differences in 
each side’s vision of the future were too great to overcome, 
especially when neither was particulary motivated to try. 
The result is enduring distrust and low-level hostility that 
occasionally flares, but for which both NATO and Russia 
share responsibility. 
Taken together, all of this suggests that Russia’s turn away 
from the West – and its continued movement on that path 
– is not so much a direct retort to any given NATO ac-
tion or announcement but rather a response significant-
ly shaped by the context (domestic and international) in 
which both parties act. Russia certainly reacts to NATO, 
but that is not the only thing to which it reacts.
Russian involvement in first the political crisis and then 
the rebel conflict has its basis in factors other than NATO 
enlargement. Such matters include economic decline in 
Russia, Putin’s surprisingly difficult election experience in 
2012, Russia’s longstanding and complicated relationship 
with Ukraine, and other political issues. Additionally, the 
great power rhetoric that Russia never truly abandoned is 
back in play as Russia attempts – in true great power fash-
ion – to get other states to adopt its “Eurasian” model and 
integrate themselves into its various structures. In other 
words, to assert that it all goes back to 1994 is to ignore 
history before and since that admittedly important – but 
perhaps not pivotal – time in East-West relations. 
It is clear from this discussion that one must go beyond 
what I have labeled the “NATO’s Fault Narrative” in or-
der to understand and effectively analyze Russian foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War era. While there is an un-
deniable relationship between NATO and Russian deci-
sion-making, the domestic political and economic con-
text in Russia played a key role, independent of NATO, 
in how Russia’s attitudes and policies evolved over the 
course of the 1990s. The causal link between NATO ex-
pansion and Russian divergence and hostility is not as 
evident and direct as some would like to believe. Fur-
  Katherine Miller
  M.A. International Security
  & Intelligence
